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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 19-1158 & 19-2086

JOSE OLVIN CRUZ,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of a Final Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge: Nelson Vargas Padilla
(Agency No. A200-120-477)

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 14, 2020
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 22, 2020)

OPINION *

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Petitioner Jose Olvin Cruz seeks review of two decisions: (1) a Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) order reinstating a prior order of removal, and (2) a decision
of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) affirming an asylum officer’s determination that Olvin
Cruz did not demonstrate a reasonable fear of persecution or torture that would warrant a
full hearing on the merits of his claims for withholding of removal or protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). No. 19-2086 EOIR A.R. 2, 54. 1 For the reasons
stated below, we must deny his petitions for review.
I. Facts and Procedural History
A. Background
Olvin Cruz is a native of Honduras. He entered the United States in 2005 and was
apprehended at the border. During an interview with an immigration official, Olvin Cruz
expressed no fear of being harmed if he returned to Honduras. He was served with an
expedited removal order and removed to Honduras in 2005.
Thereafter, Olvin Cruz reentered the United States on an unknown date without
being inspected, admitted, or paroled. In 2014, he was convicted for disorderly conduct
stemming from a fight in the street. No. 19-2086 DHS A.R. 30. DHS detained Olvin
Cruz in December 2018 and reinstated the 2005 order of removal. He then filed a
petition for review in No. 19-1158.

1

Four records have been filed for the two consolidated cases. In each case two
records were filed—one each from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“No.
19-2086 EOIR A.R.” and “No. 19-1158 EOIR A.R.”) and from DHS (“No. 19-2086 DHS
A.R.” and “No. 19-1158 DHS A.R.”).
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B. Reinstated Removal Proceedings and Reasonable Fear Interview
On March 6, 2019, Olvin Cruz had a reasonable fear interview with an asylum
officer, during which he expressed a fear of harm from MS-13 gang members in
Honduras. He stated that gang members had not threatened or harmed him but that they
had killed three of his relatives. In 2012, gang members killed one of his cousins as the
cousin was leaving a bar because of jealousy over a woman. In 2014, another cousin and
that cousin’s father, who both worked in a mayor’s office in Honduras, were kidnapped
and killed after they shut off the water supply for some gang members in the course of
their employment. Olvin Cruz stated that nobody else in his family had been harmed by
gangs, but he believed he would be targeted if he returned to Honduras because he would
be returning from the United States and because he was a member of a well-known
family. No. 19-2086 EOIR A.R. 27–38.
The asylum officer determined that Olvin Cruz failed to establish a reasonable fear
of persecution or torture, noting that his fear of harm was “not on account of a protected
characteristic” and that he failed to show that gang members were inclined to kill
members of his family on account of their membership in the particular social group
defined as “immediate members of” his family. No. 19-2086 EOIR A.R. 25. He invoked
his right to have an IJ review the asylum officer’s determination, and DHS referred the
case to an IJ.
Two weeks later, the IJ conducted a hearing during which Olvin Cruz testified. At
the close of the hearing, the IJ acknowledged Olvin Cruz’s fear of harm and found him
credible, but concluded that he did not establish that his fear of harm was related to a
3

protected ground, specifically his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion. The IJ acknowledged that Olvin Cruz’s relatives had
been harmed by gang members but found that the motivation for the attacks appeared to
stem from the relatives’ run-ins with gangs, for example over water supply, and not from
a specific animus towards the family. Accordingly, the IJ affirmed the asylum officer’s
reasonable fear determination. The IJ determined that Olvin Cruz “did not show a nexus
or a possibility of torture” and concluded that his relatives “were not targeted” on account
of a protected ground. No. 19-2086 EOIR A.R. 2. Olvin Cruz then filed a petition for
review in No. 19-2086.
II. Discussion 2
We have not decided what standard of review applies to an IJ’s negative
reasonable fear determination. 3 The Ninth Circuit has held that negative reasonable fear
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We have jurisdiction to review the IJs’ reasonable fear determination under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
3

Where a petitioner whose prior removal order has been reinstated “expresses a
fear of returning to the country of removal,” he is first screened through an interview by
an asylum officer “to determine whether the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution or
torture” and whether he is thus eligible for full consideration of his potential claim for
non-return or protection against torture. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(a)–(c), 241.8(e). To
establish a reasonable fear, the alien must show that there is a “reasonable possibility”
that he would be persecuted or tortured in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c).
If the asylum officer determines that the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution or
torture, he must refer the alien to an IJ “for full consideration” of the alien’s eligibility for
statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e). Those
proceedings are then conducted “in accordance with the provisions of § 208.16” and are
subject to the jurisdiction of the BIA and circuit courts. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e); see OrtizAlfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 956–59 (9th Cir. 2012). However, if the asylum officer
determines that the alien does not have a reasonable fear, the alien is “afforded the
opportunity for an expeditious review of the negative screening determination by an [IJ].”
Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478-01, 8485 (Feb. 19,
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determinations should be reviewed for substantial evidence. See Andrade-Garcia v.
Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016); cf. Telles v. Lynch, 639 F. App’x 658, 661–62
(1st Cir. 2016) (declining to decide what standard of review applied to a reasonable fear
determination because petitioner’s claim lacked merit under any standard of review).
The Government argues that a reasonable fear determination is merely a threshold agency
assessment, not equivalent to an agency decision denying an alien’s application for relief
or protection, and that accordingly we should review the IJ’s determination under the
deferential “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” standard first announced in
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
We need not decide which standard of review applies because, even if we review
for substantial evidence, the record does not compel an outcome in Olvin Cruz’s favor.
There is no indication that a statutorily protected ground was or would likely be a reason
for any persecution. See Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684–85 (3d Cir.
2015); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 346–48 (BIA 2010). Olvin Cruz’s
evidence reveals that his three relatives who were harmed by gang members were
targeted based on personal disputes and not based on any familial relationship. And a
general fear concerning prevalent gang activity, without more, does not establish
eligibility for withholding of removal. See Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 657 (3d

1999); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(f)–(g). If the IJ reverses the asylum officer’s

determination, he then proceeds to determine the alien’s eligibility for statutory
withholding of removal and CAT protection, and that decision is subject to review. 8
C.F.R. § 1208.31(g)(2). But where, as here, the IJ “upholds the negative screening
determination, the alien may be removed without further [administrative] review.” 64
Fed. Reg. at 8485; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(g)(1); Ortiz-Alfaro, 694 F.3d at 957, 959.
5

Cir. 2007) (holding that mistreatment resulting from gang’s bare desire for money is not
persecution on account of a protected ground); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494–95
(3d Cir. 2001) (holding that ordinary criminal activity is not persecution). To the extent
Olvin Cruz fears harm on account of his status as a returnee from the United States, those
fears do not raise a claim for relief from removal. See Bonilla v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 87,
92–93 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 498 (3d Cir. 2012)
(rejecting as “too amorphous” a proposed social group of “secularized and westernized
Pakistanis perceived to be affiliated with the United States”)); Valdiviezo–Galdamez v.
Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 589 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that members of a particular social
group must “share a common, immutable characteristic that group members either cannot
change or should not have to change because the characteristic is fundamental”).
There is also no evidence compelling the conclusion that Olvin Cruz will be
tortured in Honduras. He admitted that he was never harmed or threatened by gang
members or anyone else in Honduras, and he made no showing that he would likely be
targeted for harm if he returns to his home country. See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d
463, 478 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that reports of generalized brutality within a country do
not, in the absence of additional evidence, allow an alien to sustain his burden under the
CAT); see also Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 218 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that a
petitioner’s “chain of assumptions” and fear regarding what might happen to him is
insufficient to meet the more likely than not standard for CAT protection). Thus, under
any review standard we would affirm the IJ’s reasonable fear determination.
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Accordingly, we deny Olvin Cruz’s petition for review.
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